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A Multi-Observer Approach for Attack Detection and Isolation of
Discrete-Time Nonlinear Systems
Tianci Yang, Carlos Murguia, Margreta Kuijper, Dragan Nesˇic´
Abstract— We address the problem of attack detection and
isolation for a class of discrete-time nonlinear systems under
(potentially unbounded) sensor attacks and measurement noise.
We consider the case when a subset of sensors is subject
to additive false data injection attacks. Using a bank of
observers, each observer leading to an Input-to-State Stable
(ISS) estimation error, we propose two algorithms for detecting
and isolating sensor attacks. These algorithms make use of the
ISS property of the observers to check whether the trajectories
of observers are “consistent” with the attack-free trajectories
of the system. Simulations results are presented to illustrate the
performance of the proposed algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional control systems composed of interconnected
controllers, sensors, and actuators use point-to-point com-
munication architectures. This is no longer suitable when
new requirements – such as modularity, decentralisation of
control, integrated diagnostics, quick and easy maintenance,
and low cost – are necessary. To meet these requirements,
Networked Control Systems (NCSs) have emerged as a
technology that combines control, communication, and com-
putation, and offers the necessary flexibility to meet new
demands in distributed and large scale systems.
Recently, security of NCSs has become a very important
issue as wireless communication networks might serve as
new access points for adversaries trying to disrupt the
system dynamics. Cyber-physical attacks on control systems
have caused substantial damage to a number of physical
processes. One of the most well-known examples is the
attack on Maroochy Shire Council’s sewage control system
in Queensland, Australia that happened in January 2000.
The attacker hacked into the controllers that activate and
deactivate valves and caused flooding of the grounds of a
hotel, a park, and a river with a million liters of sewage.
Another incident is the very recent SuxNet virus that targeted
Siemens’ supervisory control and data acquisition systems
which are used in many industrial processes. These incidents
show that strategic mechanisms to identify and deal with
attacks on NCSs are strongly needed.
In [1]-[22], a range of topics related to security of
control systems have been discussed. In general, they
provide analysis tools for quantifying the performance
degradation induced by different classes of attacks and
propose reaction strategies to counter their effect on the
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system dynamics. Most of the existing work, however, has
considered control systems with linear dynamics, although
in most engineering applications the dynamics of the plants
being monitored and controlled is highly nonlinear. There
are some results addressing the nonlinear case though. In
[23], exploiting sensor redundancy, the authors address the
problem of sensor attack detection and state estimation for
uniformly observable continuous-time nonlinear systems.
Similarly, in [24], the problem of state estimation and
attack isolation for a class of noisy discrete-time nonlinear
system is considered. In particular, the authors propose an
observer-based estimator, using a bank of circle-criterion
observers, which provides a robust estimate of the system
state in spite of sensor attacks and measurement noise, and
an estimator-based isolation algorithm without knowing the
noise bounds. In this manuscript, we address the problem
of attack detection and isolation of a class of discrete-time
nonlinear systems in the presence of measurement noise and
sensor attacks. We assume that bounds on the measurement
noise and an upper bound on the number of attacked sensors
are known. We consider the setting when the system has p
sensors, all of which are subject to measurement noise and
up to q < p of them are attacked. We assume that q is known
but the exact subset of sensors being attacked is unknown.
Using a bank of the observers, each observer leading to
an ISS estimation error, we propose two algorithms for
detecting and isolating false data sensor attacks. These
algorithms make use of the ISS property of the observers to
check whether the trajectories of observers are “consistent”
with the attack-free trajectories of the system. The main
idea behind our algorithms is the following. Each observer
in the bank is driven by a different subset of sensors.
Thus, without attacks, the observers produce ISS estimation
errors with respect to measurement noise only. For every
pair of observers in the bank, we compute the largest
difference between their estimates. If a pair of observers is
driven by a subset of attack-free sensors, then the largest
difference between their estimates is also ISS with respect
to measurement noise only. However, if there are attacks on
some of the sensors, the observers driven by those sensors
might produce larger differences than the attack-free ones.
These ideas work well under the assumption that less than
p/2 sensors are attacked, i.e, q < p/2.
Notation.
We denote the set of real numbers by R, the set of
natural numbers by N , the set of integers by Z, and
R
n×m the set of n × m matrices for any m,n ∈ N.
For any vector v ∈ Rn, vJ denotes the stacking of
all vi, i ∈ J and J ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, |v| =
√
v⊤v and
supp(v) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} |vi 6= 0}. For a sequence of
vectors {v(k)}∞k=0, we denote by v[0,k] the sequence of
vectors v(i), i = 0, . . . , k, ||v||∞ , supk≥0 |v(k)| and
||v||T , sup0≤k≤T |v(k)|. We say a sequence {v(k)} ∈ l∞
if ||v||∞ < ∞. The binomial coefficient is denoted as(
a
b
)
, where a, b are nonnegative integers. We denote the
cardinality of a set S as card(S). We denote a variable
m uniformly distributed in the interval (a, b) asm ∼ U(a, b).
II. DETECTION AND ISOLATION OF SENSOR ATTACKS
In this section, we consider a class of discrete-time nonlin-
ear systems subject to sensor attacks and measurement noise.
This class of systems has been considered in [25]-[28] in the
attack-free case. Consider the system:
x+ = Ax+Gf(Hx) + ρ(u, y), (1)
y˜ = C˜x+ a+ m˜, (2)
with state x ∈ Rn, sensor measurement y˜ ∈ Rp, measure-
ment noise m˜ ∈ Rp satisfying {m˜(k)} ∈ l∞, matrices
A ∈ Rn×n, G ∈ Rn×r, and H ∈ Rr×n, and attack
vector a ∈ Rp. If sensor i ∈ {1, . . . , p} is not attacked,
then the i-th component of a(k) satisfies ai(k) = 0 for all
k ≥ 0. Otherwise, sensor i is attacked and ai(k) is arbitrary
and possibly unbounded. We denote W ⊆ {1, . . . , p} the
set of attacked sensors and thus supp(a(k)) = W for all
k ≥ 0. We assume the set W is fixed and unknown to
us. The term ρ(u, y) is a known arbitrary real-valued vector
that depends on the system inputs and outputs. The state-
dependent nonlinearity f(Hx) is an r-dimensional vector
where each entry is a function of a linear combination of the
states:
fi = fi

 n∑
j=1
Hijxj

 , i = 1, . . . , r, (3)
with Hij denotes the entries of matrix H .
Let q be the largest integer such that for each subset of
sensors J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) ≥ p − 2q > 0 an
observer of the form:
xˆ+J =AxˆJ +Gf(HxˆJ +KJ(C˜J xˆJ − y˜J))
+ LJ(C˜J xˆJ − y˜J) + ρ(u, y),
(4)
exists for y˜J ∈ Rcard(J). Here, xˆJ ∈ Rn denotes the estimate
of x from y˜J , and KJ ∈ Rr×card(J) and LJ ∈ Rn×card(J)
are the corresponding observer matrices. The matrix C˜J is
the stacking of all C˜i, i ∈ J , where C˜i denotes the i-th row
of C˜. Define the estimation error eJ (k) := xˆJ (k) − x(k).
We assume the following.
Assumption 1 If aJ(k) = 0, there exist constants cJ > 0,
λJ ∈ (0, 1), and γJ ≥ 0 satisfying:
|eJ(k)| ≤ cJλkJ |eJ(0)|+ γJ ||m˜J ||k, (5)
for k ≥ 0, eJ(0) ∈ Rn, and m˜J ∈ Rcard(J), {m˜J (k)} ∈ l∞.
Remark 1 In this manuscript, we consider systems of the
form (1)-(2) because under certain conditions on f(·), there
exist tools – based on the circle-criterion – to construct ob-
servers of the form (4) satisfying Assumption 1. In particular,
we use the result in [24], where the design method is posed
as the solution of semidefinite programs.
Assumption 2 At most q sensors are attacked, i.e.,
card(W ) ≤ q, (6)
and q > 0 is a known integer.
Assumption 3 The bound on measurement noise is known,
i.e.,
||m˜||∞ = m¯, (7)
and m¯ > 0 is a known constant.
We aim at detecting and isolating sensor attacks on system
(1)-(2) for attacks and noise satisfying Assumption 2 and
Assumption 3, respectively, and observers of the form (4)
satisfying Assumption 1.
A. Detection of sensor attacks
We construct an observer satisfying Assumption 1 for
system (1)-(2), i.e., considering all sensors, and for each
subset J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} of sensors with card(J) = p− q. The
obtained estimates are denoted as xˆ and xˆJ , respectively.
Define e = xˆ − x and let a = 0; then, under Assumption
1, there exist c > 0, λ ∈ (0, 1), and γ ≥ 0 such that
|e(k)| ≤ cλk|e(0)| + γ||m˜||k, for all e(0) ∈ Rn, k ≥ 0,
and m˜ ∈ Rp, {m˜(k)} ∈ l∞. Because λ ∈ (0, 1), it can
be easily verified that, for every ǫ > 0, there exist k∗
such that cλk|e(0)| ≤ ǫ, for all k ≥ k∗, which implies
|e(k)| ≤ ǫ + γ||m˜||k ≤ ǫ + γm¯, for k ≥ k∗. Also, for each
subset J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p − q, if aJ = 0,
there exist cJ > 0, λJ ∈ (0, 1), and γJ ≥ 0 such that
|eJ(k)| ≤ cJλkJ |e(0)|+γJ ||m˜J ||k, for all e(0) ∈ Rn, k ≥ 0,
and m˜J ∈ Rp−q , {m˜J (k)} ∈ l∞. Because λJ ∈ (0, 1), there
exists k∗J such that cJλ
k
J |e(0)| ≤ ǫ, for all k ≥ k∗J , and thus
|eJ(k)| ≤ ǫ+ γJ ||m′J ||k ≤ ǫ+ γJm¯, for k ≥ k∗J . Let
k⋆ := max
J⊂{1,...,p}:card(J)=p−q
{k∗, k∗J} ,
and define
π(k) := max
J⊂{1,...,p}:card(J)=p−q
|xˆ(k)− xˆJ (k)|. (8)
Let J(k) = argmaxJ⊂{1,...,p}:card(J)=p−q |xˆ(k) − xˆJ(k)|,
for all k ≥ k⋆. Then, if sensors are attack-free, i.e. a = 0,
we have
π(k) = |xˆ(k)− xˆJ(k)(k)|
= |xˆ(k)− x(k) + x(k)− xˆJ(k)(k)|
= |e(k)− eJ(k)(k)|
≤ |e(k)|+ |eJ(k)(k)|
≤ 2(ǫ+ γ¯m¯), (9)
for all k ≥ k⋆, where
γ¯ := max
J⊂{1,...,p}:card(J)=p−q
{γ, γJ} .
However, if sensors are under attack, i.e., a 6= 0; then, the
estimates xˆ(k) and xˆJ (k) in π(k) are likely to be inconsistent
and thus lead to larger π(k) than the attack-free case. Define
z¯ := 2(ǫ+ γ¯m¯); (10)
then, z¯ can be used as a threshold to detect sensor attacks for
k ≥ k⋆. However, it is still possible that for some k ≥ k⋆ and
ak 6= 0, inequality (9) still holds, which would result in non
detection. Then, to improve the detection rate, we perform
the detection over windows of N ∈ N time-steps. That is,
for each k ∈ [k⋆ + (i − 1)N, k⋆ + iN ], i ∈ N, we compute
π(k) and compare it with z¯ for every k in the window. If
there exists k1 ∈ [k⋆ + (i− 1)N, k⋆ + iN ], i ∈ N such that
π(k1) > z¯, then we say that sensors are under attack in the
i-th window. Otherwise, we say sensors are attack-free in
this window. This is formally stated in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Attack Detection.
1: Design an observer satisfying Assumption 1 for system
(1)-(2) and for each subset J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with
card(J) = p− q.
2: Fix the window size N ∈ N.
3: Calculate z¯ as in (10).
4: For i ∈ Z>0, calculate π(k) for
k ∈ [k⋆ + (i− 1)N, k⋆ + iN − 1].
5: For i ∈ Z>0, if ∃ k1 ∈ [k⋆ + (i− 1)N, k⋆ + iN − 1]
such that π(k1) > z¯, then sensor attacks occurs in the
i-th window, and
detection(i) = 1;
otherwise, sensors are attack-free in the i-th window,
and
detection(i) = 0.
6: Return detection(i)
Because our knowledge of ||m||∞ might be conservative,
we consider the case when the actual bound on measurement
noise is smaller than m¯, i.e., ||m||∞ = τm¯ and τ ∈ (0, 1).
We give a sufficient condition under which sensor attacks
cannot be detected by Algorithm 1 in the i-th time window
for a given N > 0.
Proposition 1 Given a time window length N > 0, if
||a||k⋆+iN−1 ≤ (1− τ)m¯; (11)
where τ ∈ (0, 1), then, π(k) ≤ z¯ for all k ∈
[k⋆ + (i− 1)N, k⋆ + iN − 1] and sensor attacks cannot be
detected by Algorithm 1 in the i-th time window.
Proof: For a given time window length N > 0, sensor
attacks cannot be detected by Algorithm 1 in the i-th time
window for a 6= 0, if we have
π(k) ≤ z¯, (12)
for all k ∈ [k⋆ + (i− 1)N, k⋆ + iN − 1]. For a 6= 0, we
have
π(k) ≤|e(k) + |eJ(k)|
≤2ǫ+ γ(||m˜||k⋆+iN−1 + ||a||k⋆+iN−1)
+ γJ (||m˜||k⋆+iN−1 + ||aJ ||k⋆+iN−1)
≤2(ǫ+ γ¯(||m˜||∞ + ||a||k⋆+iN−1)
≤2(ǫ+ γ¯(τm¯+ ||a||k⋆+iN−1)),
for all k ∈ [k⋆ + (i− 1)N, k⋆ + iN − 1]. It follows that
the inequality (12) is satisfied for a satisfying (11) for all
k ∈ [k⋆ + (i− 1)N, k⋆ + iN − 1] and thus sensor attacks
cannot be detected by Algorithm 1 in the i-th time window.
Next, we give a sufficient condition under which sensor
attacks can always be detected by Algorithm 1 in the i-th
time window for a given N > 0.
Proposition 2 For a given time window length N > 0, if
there exist k1 ∈ [k⋆ + (i− 1)N, k⋆ + iN − 1] such that
|e(k1)| > 3(ǫ+ γ¯m¯); (13)
then, π(k1) > z¯ and thus sensor attacks can be detected by
Algorithm 1 in the i-th time window.
Proof: For a given time window length N > 0,
sensor attacks can be detected by Algorithm 1 in the
i-th time window for a 6= 0, if there exist k1 ∈
[k⋆ + (i− 1)N, k⋆ + iN − 1] such that π(k1) > z¯. Since
there are at most q sensors under attack, we know there exist
at least one I¯ ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(I¯) = p− q such that
aI¯ = 0, and
|eI¯(k)| ≤ ǫ+ γI¯ ||m˜I¯ ||k, (14)
for k ≥ k⋆. From (8), we know π(k) ≥ |e(k) − eI¯(k)| for
k ≥ k⋆. If (13) holds, then
π(k1) ≥ ||e(k1)| − |eI¯(k1)||
> 3(ǫ+ γ¯m¯)− ǫ− γI¯ ||m˜I¯ ||k1
> 2(ǫ+ γ¯m¯), (15)
which implies sensor attacks can be detected by Algorithm
1 in the i-th time window.
B. Isolation of sensor attacks
To perform the isolation, we construct an observer satisfy-
ing Assumption 1 for each subset J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} of sensors
with card(J) = p − q and each subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , p} of
sensors with card(S) = p − 2q. Hence, by Assumption 1,
for aS(k) = 0, there exist cS > 0, λS ∈ (0, 1), and γS ≥ 0
satisfying
|eS(k)| ≤ cSλkS |e(0)|+ γS ||m˜S ||k, (16)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0. Note that, because λS ∈ (0, 1),
there always exist k∗S such that cSλ
k
S |e(0)| ≤ ǫ, for any
ǫ > 0 and k ≥ k∗S . Define k¯∗ := maxJ,S {k∗J , k∗S} . For each
subset J with card(J) = p− q, define πJ(k) as
πJ (k) := max
S⊂J:card(S)=p−2q
|xˆJ(k)− xˆS(k)|. (17)
Since there are at most q sensors under attack, we know there
exist at least one I¯ ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(I¯) = p− q such
that aI¯ = 0 and (14) is satisfied. Define
πI¯(k) := max
S⊂I¯
|xˆI¯(k)− xˆS(k)|
= max
S⊂I¯
|xˆI¯(k)− x(k) + x(k)− xˆS(k)|
≤ |eI¯(k)|+max
S⊂I¯
|eS(k)|. (18)
From (14) and (16), we obtain πI¯(k) ≤ 2(ǫ + γ′I¯ ||m˜I¯ ||k),
for all k ≥ k¯∗, where
γ′
I¯
:= max
S⊂I¯:card(S)=p−2q
{γI¯ , γS} .
However, if the subset J of sensors is under attack, i.e., aJ 6=
0, then xˆJ (k) and xˆS(k) in πJ (k) are more inconsistent and
might produce larger πJ (k). Define
z¯J = 2(ǫ+ γ
′
Jm¯), (19)
for each J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p− q, where
γ′J := max
S⊂J:card(S)=p−2q
{γJ , γS} ;
then, z¯J can be used as a threshold to isolate attacked
sensors. For all k ≥ k¯∗, we select out all the subsets
J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p− q that satisfy
πJ(k) ≤ z¯J . (20)
Denote as W¯ (k) the set of sensors that we regard as attack-
free at time k. Then, W¯ (k) is given as the union of all subsets
J such that (20) holds:
W¯ (k) :=
⋃
J⊂{1,...,p}:card(J)=p−q,πJ (k)≤z¯J
J. (21)
Thus, the set {1, . . . , p} \ W¯ (k) is isolated as the set of
attacked sensors at time k. However, note that it is still
possible that for some k ≥ k¯∗ and some J ⊂ {1, . . . , p}
with card(J) = p − q, aJ(k) 6= 0 but (20) still holds.
This implies that J ⊂ W¯ (k) even if aJ 6= 0 and would
result in wrong isolation. Therefore, we perform the isolation
over windows of N ∈ N time-steps. That is, for each
k ∈ [k¯∗+(i−1)N, k¯∗+ iN ], i ∈ N, we compute and collect
W¯ (k) for every k in the window and select the subset J
with card(J) ≥ p − q that is equal to W¯ (k) most often in
the i-th window. We denote this J as J(i). Then, we select
{1, . . . , p} \ J(i) as the set of sensors under attack in the
i-th window. This is formally stated in Algorithm 2.
Next, we give a sufficient condition under which none of
the attacked sensors can be isolated by Algorithm 2 in the
i-th time window for a given N > 0 when ||m||∞ = τ · m¯
where τ ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition 3 Given a time window length N > 0, if
||a||k¯∗+iN−1 ≤ (1− τ)m¯; (22)
where τ ∈ (0, 1), then, for all J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with
card(J) = p − q and aJ 6= 0, πJ(k) ≤ z¯J for all k ∈[
k¯∗ + (i− 1)N, k¯∗ + iN − 1] and none of attacked sensors
can be isolated by Algorithm 2 in the i-th time window.
Algorithm 2 Attack Isolation.
1: Design an observer satisfying Assumption 1 for each
subset J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p− q and each
subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(S) = p− 2q .
2: Intialize the counter variable nJ(i) = 0 for all J
with card(J) ≥ p− q and all i ∈ Z>0.
3: Calculate z¯J for each J with card(J) = p− q as (19).
4: For i ∈ Z>0 and ∀k ∈
[
k¯∗ + (i − 1)N, k¯∗ + iN − 1],
calculate πJ (k), ∀J with card(J) = p− q as follows:
πJ(k) = max
S⊂J:card(S)=p−2q
|xˆJ (k)− xˆS(k)|.
5: For all k ∈ [k¯∗ + (i− 1)N, k¯∗ + iN − 1], take the
union of all the subsets J such that πJ (k) ≤ z¯J :
W¯ (k) =
⋃
J⊂{1,...,p}:card(J)=p−q,πJ (k)≤z¯J
J,
6: For all k ∈ [k¯∗ + (i− 1)N, k¯∗ + iN − 1], if
W¯ (k) = J for some J with card(J) ≥ p− q, then
update its corresponding counter variable as follows:
nJ(i) = nJ(i) + 1.
7: For all i ∈ Z>0, select the subset J with card(J) ≥
p− q that is equal to W¯ (k) most often, i.e.,
J(i) = argmax
J∈{1,...,p}:card(J)≥p−q
nJ(i).
8: For all i ∈ Z>0, the set of sensors potentially under
attack is given as:
A˜(i) = {1, . . . , p} \ J(i).
9: For all i ∈ Z>0, return A˜(i).
Proof: For given time window length N > 0, none
of attacked sensors can be isolated by Algorithm 2 in
the i-th window if ∀J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) =
p − q and aJ 6= 0, we have πJ (k) ≤ z¯J for
all k ∈ [k¯∗ + (i− 1)N, k¯∗ + iN − 1]. For all k ∈[
k¯∗ + (i− 1)N, k¯∗ + iN − 1] and aJ 6= 0, we have
πJ (k) ≤|eJ(k) + |eS(k)|
≤2ǫ+ γJ(||m˜J ||∞ + ||aJ ||∞)
+ γS(||m˜S ||k¯∗+iN−1 + ||aS ||k¯∗+iN−1)
≤2ǫ+ 2γ′J(||m˜J ||k¯∗+iN−1 + ||aJ ||k¯∗+iN−1)
≤2(ǫ+ γ′J(τm¯ + ||a||k¯∗+iN−1)).
If (22) holds, then πJ(k) ≤ z¯J for all J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with
card(J) = p− q and all k ∈ [k¯∗ + (i− 1)N, k¯∗ + iN − 1].
Then, none of attacked sensors can be isolated by Algorithm
2 in the i-th time window.
Next, we give a sufficient condition under which all of
attacked sensors can be isolated by Algorithm 2 in the i-th
time window for a given time window length N > 0.
Proposition 4 Given a time window length N > 0, if for all
J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p− q and aJ 6= 0, we have
|eJ(k)| > 3(ǫ+ γ′Jm¯), (23)
for at least N/2 time-steps in the i-th time window, then
for all J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p − q and aJ 6= 0,
we have πJ (k) > z¯J for at least N/2 time-steps in the i-th
time window, and all of attacked sensors can be isolated by
Algorithm 2 in the i-th time window.
Proof: Since there are at most q sensors under attack,
for each subset J with card(J) = p − q we know there
exist at least one S¯ ⊂ J with card(S¯) = p − 2q such
that aS¯ = 0, and |eS¯ | ≤ ǫ + γS¯ ||m˜S¯ ||k, for all k ∈[
k¯∗ + (i− 1)N, k¯∗ + iN − 1]. By construction of (17), it
is satisfied that
πJ (k) = max
S⊂J card(S)=p−2q
|xˆJ (k)− xˆS(k)|
≥ |eJ(k)− eS¯(k)|.
for all k ≥ k¯∗. If (23) holds at least N/2 time-steps in
the i-th time window, then from triangle inequality, for all
J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p− q and aJ 6= 0, we have
πJ (k) ≥ ||eJ(k)| − |eS¯(k)||
> 3(ǫ+ γ′Jm¯)− ǫ− γS¯ ||m˜S¯ ||k
> 2(ǫ+ γ′Jm¯), (24)
for at least N/2 time-steps in the i-th time window, which
implies all of attacked sensors can be isolated by Algorithm
2 in the i-th time window.
Remark 2 The performance of Algorithm 2 can be arbitrar-
ily improved by increasing the length of the time window N
at the price of increasing the time needed for isolation.
Example 1 Consider the discrete-time nonlinear system
subject to measurement noise and sensor attacks:
x+ =
[
1 δ
0 1
]
x+
[
1
2δα sin(x1 + x2)
δα sin(x1 + x2)
]
+
[
δu
δu
]
, (25)
y˜ =


3 0.3
3 0.6
6 0.9
1.2 12

x+ a+ m˜. (26)
with δ = 0.1, α = 1, and m˜i ∼ U(−0.5, 0.5) for i ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4}. Using the design method proposed in [24], we
find that circle-criterion observers of the form (4) satisfying
Assumption 1 exist for each subset J ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4} with
card(J) ≥ 1. Since p = 4, by Assumption 2, the maximum
number of attacks is q = 1. We design a circle-criterion
observer for the whole system and for each J ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4}
with card(J) = 3 and each S ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4} with card(S) =
2. Therefore, in total,
(
4
3
)
+
(
4
2
)
+ 1 = 11 observers are de-
signed. We obtain their ISS gains by montecarlo simulations.
Theses eleven observers are initialized at xˆ(0) = x(0) and
x1(0), x2(0) are randomly selected from a standard normal
distribution; thus, ǫ = 0. We let N = 50, 100, 200 and
evaluate Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 for 1000 time-steps.
For Algorithm 1, we let W = {2}, which means the 2-nd
sensor is under attack, and a2 ∼ U(−c, c) with c given by 0.7
and 1. We run Algorithm 1 with
(
4
3
)
+1 = 5 observers. The
detection results are shown in Figures 1-2. For Algorithm 2,
we let W = {3} and a3 ∼ U(−d, d) with d given by 2 and
5. We run Algorithm 2 with
(
4
3
)
+
(
4
2
)
= 10 observers. We
say sensor 0 is under attack in the i-th window when A˜i = ∅.
The isolation results are shown below in Figures 3-4.
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Fig. 1. Attack detection, a2 ∼ U(−0.7, 0.7).
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Fig. 2. Attack detection, a2 ∼ U(−1, 1).
III. CONCLUSION
Assuming that a sufficiently small subset of sensors is
subject to additive false data injection attacks, we have
proposed two algorithms for detecting and isolating sensor
attacks for a class of discrete-time nonlinear systems subject
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Fig. 3. Attack isolation, a3 ∼ U(−2, 2).
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Fig. 4. Attack isolation, a3 ∼ U(−5, 5).
to measurement noise using a multi-observer approach. We
have provided simulations results to illustrate the perfor-
mance of the proposed algorithms. The performance of our
algorithms can be improved by increasing the length of the
time window N at the price of increasing the time needed
for detection and isolation.
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